



IED TM Lesson 2.4: Threat Assessment



Overview

2.4.1 Introduction to Threat Assessment

2.4.2 Source of information and Intelligence

2.4.3 Threat Intent

2.4.4 Threat Capability

2.4.5 Threat Opportunity to Use IEDs

2.4.6 Issuing a Threat Summary



Terminal Learning Objectives


At the end of this module the participant will be able to explain the threat assessment process and interpret a threat summary.



2.4.1 Introduction to Threat Assessment

Intro to Threat Assessment

C-IED Threat Assessment is a simple process that allows us to combine intelligence with knowledge of the local environment and an understanding of an adversary to determine the **most likely** location, time and type of an IED attack.



Intro to Threat Assessment



Intro to Threat Assessment





2.4.2 Source of Information and Intelligence

Sources of Information and Intelligence



Intention

- Intelligence Reports
- J2/S2 Cell
- Engagement



Capability

- Historical data
- Recent incident reports
- IED trends
- EOD Cell



Ground

- Military Maps
- Open source maps – Google
- Patrol traces
- Hotspot Maps
- Human Terrain Analysis



2.4.3 Threat Intent

Threat Intent



Threat Intent



Build our understanding of the aggressor to determine the likelihood and type of attack.

- **Who** is the enemy or adversary?
- **What** are they trying to achieve?
- **Who** are they targeting?

Threat Intent

Who is the threat?

Professional



Opportunist



Fundamentalist



Threat Intent

What is the threat trying to achieve?



- What is the adversary stated goals? (At a macro and local level)
- What is their attitude towards us as a peacekeeping force?
- What have they been trying to achieve to date?

Threat Intent

Who is the threat targeting?

Friendly forces?

- Foot patrols
- Mounted patrols
- Logistic convoy
- Attacks on FOBs
- Attacks on targetable patterns

Infrastructure?

Other armed groups?

Civilians? Or specific civilian group?

Government institution or process



Threat Intent


The Local Population





2.4.4 Aggressor Capability

Threat Capability



What type of device will the aggressor try to use and how will it be initiated?

Threat Capability

Consider Type of Device and Means of Initiation:

- Time IED
- Command IED
- Victim Operated IED

What has the aggressor successfully used?

- Remember your key sources of information.

Friendly force activity will also determine what type of IEDs will be employed.


Threat Capability

Command IEDs

- Favourable for targetable patterns in **space** and **time**.
- Able to attack specific targets and avoid others.
- Require favourable terrain.

Considerations:

- Are you presenting frequent and trackable targets
- Think of your posture – are you high profile and fairly inflexible in the routes you use?




Threat Capability

VO IEDs

- Favourable for targetable patterns in **space** but **not** time.
- Indiscriminate
- Require favourable terrain.

Considerations:

- Are you setting patterns on patrols?
- What is the aggressor attitude towards civilians
- Has civilian pattern of life changes




Threat Capability

Time IEDs

- Favourable for targetable patterns in **space** and very specific **time**.
- Indiscriminate
- Aggressor loses control once deployed.

Considerations:


- Does your daily routine afford the use of an IED attack?
- Does your base have poor security procedures?
- Who has access?





2.4.5 Threat Opportunity to Use IEDs

Threat Opportunity



Where will the device be located and **when** will it be employed?

- How will the enemy employ the ground to achieve best effect.
- Identification of **Vulnerable Points** and **Vulnerable Areas**.

Threat Opportunity

VPs and VAs

A Vulnerable Point (VP) is a **specific point** where it is particularly advantageous to target friendly forces with an IED and/or Small Arms Light Weapons (SALW), ambush or both. They are typically characterized by prominent or restrictive feature

Vulnerable Areas (VA) are those areas where the ground/terrain lends itself to IED or SALW attack.

Threat Opportunity

VPs and VAs

Terrain Oriented VA/VP


A terrain orientated VP/VA is where the ground offers a particular advantage

Situationally Oriented VA/VP

An adversary may use friendly forces patterns or predictable actions/responses to mount an attack at a specific point. It may be difficult to fully understand the adversary's intent during planning; where this is the case, Advanced Search assets should be tasked or advice sought from a Search Advisor.

Threat Opportunity

Terrain Orientation



Threat Opportunity

Situation Orientation



Threat Opportunity

Vulnerable Points

- Obvious road junctions or bends in roads
- High banked roads, culverts or bridges
- Choke points
- River, stream or Wadi crossings
- Previous patrol routes.
- Previous and likely ICP locations and cordon positions
- Frequently used/obvious approaches to SF base locations
- Potholes or other known obstructions on roads, tracks or paths


Threat Opportunity

Vulnerable Points – Previous Attack Sites



Threat Opportunity

Vulnerable Points – Approach to friendly force locations



Threat Opportunity

Vulnerable Points – Previously occupied locations

No	Year	Incident in Host Nation FOB	IED
1	2017	25 June, conduct a pre-dawn attack and briefly occupies the FOB	
2	2018	7 June, conduct a pre-dawn attack and briefly occupies the FOB	YES
3	2018	25 August, conduct a pre-dawn attack and briefly occupies the FOB	
4	2018	15 October, conduct a pre-dawn attack and briefly occupies the FOB	YES
5	2018	1 December, Host Nation vacate the FOB due to political issues allowing to occupy the position	
6	2019	17 August, conduct a pre-dawn attack and briefly occupies the FOB	
7	2020	25 March, conduct a pre-dawn attack and briefly occupies the FOB	YES
8	2020	5 August, conduct a pre-dawn attack and briefly occupies the FOB	YES ₃₂

Threat Opportunity

Vulnerable Points – Culverts



Threat Opportunity

Vulnerable Points – Bridges



Songobia Bridge, Mali

Threat Opportunity

Vulnerable Points – Intersections and Junctions



Threat Opportunity

Vulnerable Points – Sharp Turns



Threat Opportunity

Vulnerable Points – Choke Points



IED on a choke point in Timbuktu Mali

Threat Opportunity

Vulnerable Areas

Common characteristics of vulnerable areas include (mnemonic **POLICE THESE**):

- **P**reviously used tracks & patrol routes
- **O**ften used positions
- **L**inear features
- **I**nterior of buildings
- **C**analized routes
- **E**xtended long stretches of road

- **T**actically important areas
- **H**igh ground dominated areas
- **E**scape routes into and out of areas
- **S**uccessive VPs in close proximity
- **E**xit or entry of areas of urban / rural interfaces;

Threat Opportunity

Vulnerable Areas – Examples




Long sections
of channeled
terrain



A series of VPs
close together



Terrain
dominated by
high ground



Urban rural
interface

Threat Opportunity

VP's and VA's

Remember CAGES!

- **Channelled:** Are we channelled? Is the terrain forcing us to slow down and travel through a specific point?
- **Aiming Markers:** Are there Aiming Markers or Warning Markers?
- **Ground:** Does the terrain lend itself to an attack
- **Environment:** Atmospherics?
- **Setting Patterns:** Have we set targetable patterns?



Threat Opportunity

VP's and VA's


On going threat assessment

- Maintain Situational Awareness – continuously employ CAGES
- Are you on a route of own choosing?



2.4.6 Issuing a Threat Assessment Summary


Issuing a Threat Summary



Threat Assessment is the consolidated answer to the following questions:

- **Who** is the enemy or adversary?
- **What** are they trying to achieve?
- **Who** are they targeting?
- **What** type of device will the aggressor try to use and how will it be initiated?
- **Where** will the device be located and **when** will it be employed?

Issuing a Threat Summary



A Threat Assessment **Summary** is a narrative summary of the answer to the questions.

It is a simplified summary of the threat assessment that can be understood at all levels of command.

Issuing a Threat Summary

Who are the aggressor: An IED cell from the Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC).

Who are they targeting: Local security forces but also willing to target UNAC patrols.

What is their intended outcome: Reduce the local security force patrols to give the CISC better freedom of movement.

What is being used: They are capable of using all types of IED but they prefer to use command IEDs to avoid civilian casualties.

Where will they be targeted: Generally on VPs where there is significant slow down points with good lines of sight and opportunity extract.

When will they be targeted: During local security force patrols.

Issuing a Threat Summary

The most likely threat is from the local IED cell of the CISC who is known to operate from the local town of GALASI where they have local support. The cell is known to target local security forces who tend to operate in soft skin vehicles. They also opportunistically target UNAC vehicles, preferring to target convoys, specifically soft skin, logistics vehicles. Their key objective to deter local security forces and UNAC patrols which will afford the CISC greater freedom of movement and opportunity to gain local political support.

They are capable of using all types of IED but they prefer to use command IEDs to avoid civilian casualties. Generally, the CISC have preferred the use of Command Wire IED to eliminate the effect of ECM which UNAC are known to employ. Generally, they will follow up attacks/IED explosion with small arms fire but they rarely become engaged, instead choosing to use the SAF to enable quick extraction.

At VPs on the rural/urban interface where urban areas can overwatch VPs. Extremists aim to target convoys at these slow down points where they have good line of sight and linear features to hide command wires before extracting, using the cover of the urban area and blending into the civilian population.

Questions?

